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Abstract: 
This paper proposes that the thalamus is the site of a wave excitation, whose function is to represent 
the locations of things around the animal. Neurons couple to the wave as transmitters and receivers. 
The wave acts as an analogue representation of local space. This has benefits over a purely neural 
representation of space. 
Several lines of evidence support this hypothesis – both theoretical, concerning efficient Bayesian 
inference in the brain – and empirical, concerning the neuro-anatomy of the thalamus. Across all 
species, the most basic function of the brain is to coordinate movements in space. To represent 
positions in space only by neural firing rates would be complex and inefficient. It is possible that that 
the brain represents 3D space in a direct and natural way – by a 3D wave. 
 
Keywords: Thalamus; TRN; wave storage; Bayes' theorem; analogue computation; 3-D space; hub-
and-spoke architecture; Fourier transform; hologram; brain energy consumption; geometry of 
consciousness.
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1. Introduction 
This article introduces a radical proposal; namely, that 
there are physical waves in the thalamus that encode the 
three-dimensional geometry of our lived world. At first 
glance, this may seem an outlandish proposal, given our 
current understanding of functional brain architectures and 
their neurophysiology. However, a closer inspection of this 
‘Thalamic Wave Hypothesis’ suggests that it should be 
taken seriously as a generalisation of established principles 
of functional anatomy – a generalisation that not only 
resolves some deep issues about the nature of how we 
represent space, but also enjoys a remarkable amount of 
empirical support. 
The notion of place coding and subsequent 
representational maps in the brain is well established [Chen 
et al., 2014; Lisman and Buzsaki, 2008; Livingstone and 
Hubel, 1988; Moser et al., 2015; O'Keefe and Recce, 1993; 
Stachenfeld et al., 2017; Zeki, 2005; Zeki and Shipp, 1988]. 
The most celebrated example of this is the retinotopic 
mapping that defines the functional architecture of early 
visual cortex [Maunsell and Treue, 2006; Nealey and 
Maunsell, 1994; Zeki and Shipp, 1988]. The Thalamic 
Wave Hypothesis takes this idea further – to the encoding 
of three-dimensional spatial information. I will focus on 
the spatial encoding and geometry that is a necessary part 
of our internal or generative models [Rudrauf et al., 2017; 
Williford et al., 2018].  
If any computing mechanism obeys the same physical laws 
as the subjects of its processing (its domain of the 
computation), there can be major benefits in 
computational efficiency. The results of the computation 
are physically constrained to obey constraints of the 
domain. Appropriate computations then result from the 
underlying physical mechanism, and do not need to be 
designed into the computing architecture. This can 
dramatically reduce the complexity of the design space for 
computers, while also furnishing more efficient 
computation. 
This paper suggests that when the brain computes about 
3D local space, it uses an analogue representation of 3D 
spatial positions – stored in a 3D wave.  
Because of their advantages, analogue computers were 
used until the 1960s – after which they were eclipsed by 
the remarkable success of digital computers, resulting from 
Moore’s law [Moore 1965].  There is no Moore’s law for 
animal brains. While neurons act as a universal computing 
engine in brains, they have costs, such as brain energy 
costs which are significant for many animals. We should 
not discount the idea that some aspects of animal 
cognition use analogue computing mechanisms [Sloman 
1975]. 
In what follows, I hope to unpack the advantages of 
analogue 3D spatial computation from first principles. A 
related account of how nervous systems (self) organise to 
become a living model of their world can be found in early 
accounts of cybernetics; e.g., the good regulator theorem 
[Conant and Ashby, 1970; Seth, 2015], right through to 
current formulations of the Bayesian brain in terms of 
concepts like the free energy principle [Friston et al., 2006]. 
The underlying theme here is that to survive and navigate 
in a world – given just sensory impressions of that world – 
it is necessary to have an internal model of the world. In 
turn, this implies that certain aspects of the ‘model’ (i.e., 
brain) recapitulate the causal structure behind the sense 
data. A basic foundation of that structure is three-
dimensional Euclidean geometry. 
The proposal here is that there are (non-neuronal) 
dynamics in the brain (i.e. the thalamus) that maintain a 
one-to-one mapping with the geometry of the world 
causing our sensations. In what follows, I rehearse the 
evolutionary imperatives for this sort of representation 
from both a biological and computational perspective. I 
will then review the anatomical and physiological evidence 
in support of the Thalamic Wave Hypothesis before 
turning to its explanatory scope – in terms of comparative 
anatomy, evolution and the form of consciousness.  
Waves can serve as an analogue representation of 
positions, in that wave vectors obey the same 3D 
geometric constraints as positions in space. Components 
of the wave and points in space are related by a Fourier 
transform, which preserves geometric relations (as in a 
hologram). In representing 3D positions of objects, a wave 
may have major advantages over a representation in neural 
firing rates: 
 Simplicity of design 
 High capacity, to represent positions of many objects 
(or the probability density over many positions of one 
object) 
 High spatial precision 
 Geometric fidelity 
 High input-output connectivity 
 High speed of storage and retrieval 
 Direct computation of geometric displacements (3-D 
vector subtractions) 
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There are several lines of empirical evidence for a wave 
representing positions in the thalamus. These are unpacked 
in the later sections of the paper: 
 Neural connectivity of the thalamus: the thalamus 
is a relay station for just those sense data required to 
fix the positions of objects; but it does not relay sense 
data not used for object location (notably olfaction)  
 Shaped of the thalamus and TRN: Across many 
species, the thalamus has approximately equal spatial 
extension in all three dimensions – suitable for holding 
a wave – and the thalamic reticular nucleus (TRN) has 
the form of a thin shell around the thalamus (suitable 
to be a transmitter of the wave, immersing the volume 
of the thalamus) 
 The anatomy of the thalamus and the  TRN only 
make sense in a wave hypothesis: The thalamus has 
many nuclei, with no direct connections between 
them. Why are they close together? Axonal energy 
costs would be reduced (over evolutionary time) if 
thalamic nuclei migrated out towards cortex – if the 
thalamus exploded. Similarly, the shell-like form of the 
TRN is uneconomical in axonal connection lengths. 
This anatomy (found across many species) only makes 
sense if all the thalamic nuclei need to be immersed in 
the same wave. 
 The form of consciousness: A large part of 
consciousness takes the form of a faithful 3D 
geometric model of one’s present surroundings. If 
consciousness arises from the thalamic wave, this gives 
a simple and testable account of the core experimental 
fact about consciousness – its 3D geometric nature. 
If the wave hypothesis is correct, it has profound 
implications for neuroscience. It would imply that many of 
the most important functions of any animal brain – any 
function involving spatial cognition – are accomplished 
not by neurons alone, but by neurons coupled to the wave.  
2. Spatial Cognition – the Requirement 
Since animals first had limbs and complex sense data – in 
the Cambrian era, some 500 million years ago – brains 
have been subject to some simple, universal, and highly 
demanding requirements, to make use of the sense data 
and control limbs. 
An imperative for the animal brain is to control muscular 
movements. This involves knowing where things are, and 
what they are, in 3D space. The things include your own 
limbs, so you can make appropriate actions towards the 
other things you perceive – move towards them, or move 
around them, or bite them, or grasp them, or strike them. 
These are the core things that every animal brain needs to 
control, at every moment of the day. The selection 
pressure to do them right is very strong indeed. Yet the 
requirements to do it well are very stringent: 
 Things are located in three dimensional space: so the 
brain needs to represent locations in 3D space – with 
three degrees of freedom for every represented point. 
 Locations obey the constraints of 3D geometry: for 
instance, if the displacement from object i to object j is 
the 3-vector aij , then aik = aij + ajk , for any i, j, and k. 
 Most of the time, most things do not move. This core 
(Bayesian) prior determines which things need paying 
attention to – the things that are really moving in 3D 
allocentric space. It also economizes on sense data – if 
something is not moving, you need not keep checking 
where it is. The constraint does not apply to raw sense 
data (which change for many reasons) only to a model 
of objects in 3D space which can be inferred from it1. 
 Things around the animal need to be classified, into 
classes which matter to the animal – food, potential 
mates, predators, shelter, and so on. 
 The things in any class have similar 3D shapes, 
wherever they are relative to the animal. This Bayesian 
prior is enormously useful both in learning to 
recognize those shapes (allowing learning to be orders 
of magnitude faster, using far fewer learning examples) 
and then in recognising the shapes from moment to 
moment. Again, this is not a constraint on raw sense 
data; it is a constraint on a 3D model inferred from 
sense data. 
The last requirement can be stated as a requirement for 
translationally invariant pattern learning and pattern 
recognition – to learn and recognize the same classes of 
thing, wherever they are in 3D space around the animal. It 
implies a requirement for spatial steering, to steer sense 
data arising from anywhere around the animal, to modular 
learning and recognition units in the brain [Olshausen et al, 
1993, 1995]. This signal steering should be free of place-
dependent distortion. 
These universal constraints have applied to all vertebrate 
brains since the Cambrian era. They have exerted 
enormous cumulative selection pressures on the design of 
brains. We would expect brains to have adapted very well 
to them. We know that very effective brain designs to have 
evolved - so brains have adapted well to these 
requirements. 
Yet in terms of neural computing architecture, the 
requirements are far from trivial. It is not obvious how a 
neural computer might embody these constraints. To cite 
one measure of this difficulty: while modern neuroscience 
and AI have made great strides in understanding some 
                                                     
1 Technically, this means that there is a minimisation of 
complexity that is inherent in Bayesian inference (i.e., log 
Bayesian evidence is accuracy minus complexity). Having a low 
dimensional representation of allocentric space therefore 
provides the most efficient, nonredundant or minimally complex 
inference. 
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aspects of cognition (such as language) the progress in 
spatial cognition has at best been modest. The leading 
examples of the art – convolutional neural nets [LeCun, 
Bengio & Hinton, 2015] – employ algorithms which have 
little biological relevance. They use huge computing power, 
and require huge and biologically infeasible numbers of 
training examples. 
The essence of the five requirements above is to represent 
the 3D locations of objects in space, in a way that obeys 
the constraints of 3D Euclidean geometry. Besides using 
neural firing rates to represent 3D positions (which is the 
mainstream hypothesis of modern neuroscience), there is 
an alternative approach to meeting those requirements. 
3. The Wave Hypothesis 
This section sets out the core hypothesis of the paper - 
stated for mammals, although its application may be wider. 
Letters in bold type represent 3-vectors. The hypothesis 
has the following components: 
 There is a wave excitation in the thalamus (whose 
physical nature is not yet known) 
 The wave is a superposition of many components with 
different wave vectors k.  
 A component with wave vector k represents an object 
at position r = λk in some allocentric frame of 
reference (the frame is chosen so that in the short 
term most objects do not move, most of the time) 
 Neurons couple to the wave, as transmitters and 
receivers 
 The Thalamic Reticular Nucleus (TRN), surrounding 
the dorsal thalamus, acts as a transmitter for the wave, 
so that the wave immerses all dorsal thalamic nuclei 
 Neurons in dorsal thalamic nuclei (particularly in 
secondary nuclei) act as receptors for the wave, 
sending outputs to cortex.  
 Individual thalamic receptor neurons may be sensitive 
to a range of wave vectors k 
 Neurons may be tunable, allowing their range of k to 
change dynamically. 
These points are shown in a diagram: 
 
While the physical nature of the wave is not yet known, 
there are many kinds of quantized excitation known in 
condensed-matter physics, and they have been explored in 
biological material [Frohlich 1968, Davidov 1977, 1985]. It 
would be premature to suppose, just because we have not 
found an obvious candidate for the thalamic wave, that it 
could not have evolved.  
Furthermore, we would expect the wave to exist now at 
low intensities, having evolved to economise on brain 
energy consumption [Attwell & Laughlin, 2001; Chklovskii 
et al 2002] ; we should not expect to detect it easily, 
without a clear idea of what we are looking for. 
One example of a non-synaptic interaction between 
neurons is ephaptic coupling [Jefferies 1995] which 
involves local electric fields. 
4. Computational Benefits of Wave 
Storage of Spatial Data 
To compare a wave storage of 3D positions with a purely 
neural storage mechanism, we need some proposals for 
what the neural mechanism might be. This presents some 
difficulty, as there has been little theoretical work to define 
a neural 3D  storage mechanism, or empirical work to test 
it. 
There are many two-dimensional neural maps in the brain, 
[Livingstone & Hubel 1988; Nealey & Maunsell 1994; 
Maunsell & Treue 2006; Zeki  2005] where the location of 
a neuron in some sheet denotes a 2D position. This is an 
analogue representation of 2D position, and we might try 
to extend it to three dimensions, in one of two possible 
ways: 
 Position is denoted by the location of a neuron in 
some 3D cluster of neurons. 
 Two dimensions of position are denoted by the 
position of a neuron in a sheet; and the third 
dimension (e.g. depth) is defined in some other way. 
We can perhaps discount the first option because: 
Cortical 
Neurons
Transmitter shell
(TRN) 
Wave cavity 
(dorsal thalamus)
Tunable receivers
(in secondary nuclei)
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 a 3D cluster of neurons would pose severe difficulties 
of connectivity for neurons near the centre of the 
cluster. 
 No such cluster of neurons has been observed 
anatomically or physiologically in the form of 
organised, map-like2 3D 'place cells'. 
 Such a 3D 'place by place' representation would show 
obvious place-dependent lesion effects, which as far as 
I know have not been observed. 
We are left with two options: 
a. Some highly distributed architecture, in which 
information about the location of one object in space 
is distributed across large numbers of neurons. 
b. A representation in which at least one dimension of 
the position of an object is represented by the firing 
rates of some small set of neurons - as in a '2D map + 
depth' representation, or a 'triplet' representation in 
which all three dimensions of a position are 
represented by firing rates. 
A fully distributed architecture (a) has interesting potential, 
but has hardly been investigated. I therefore focus on 
possible neural representations (b) in which one or more 
dimensions of position are represented by firing rates. 
Besides the problem of choice of a coordinate system, 
these neural representations face major challenges: 
1. Spatial precision versus speed: In the simple 
case where some dimension of an object's position 
is represented by a single neuron's rate of firing, 
over the time period where that neuron emits 100 
spikes (say of the order of 1 second), the statistical 
precision of  the coordinate3 is approximately one 
part in 10. Precision only increases as the square 
root of the number of spikes. For small mammals, 
this precision seems inadequate. There may of 
course be more complex representations of the 
coordinate, but those representations would 
compound the next challenge. 
2. Computing spatial displacements: It is a core 
requirement that when the positions a and b of 
two objects are represented, some modules of the 
brain (such as those for pattern learning and 
                                                     
2 The 3D place cells observed in the bat hippocampus by 
[Wohlgemuth et al 2018] appear, like other place cells [O'Keefe 
and Recce 1993], not to be topographically organised as a map 
of local space; so those cells do not appear suitable to store a 3D 
geometric model of local space - unlike, say, the V1 visual cortex 
which does represent 2D geometry. 
3 Clearly, this argument about spike rate codes only applies to 
single neurons. It is possible that place codes could be encoded 
by populations of neurons, whose precision would increase with 
the number of neurons in each ensemble. For simple encodings, 
precision only increases as the square root of the number of 
neurons. Complex encodings make processing more complex. 
recognition) should have rapid and precise access 
to the spatial displacement (a-b) between them 
[Olshausen et al. 2003]. Computing any coordinate 
of (a-b) requires precise subtraction of distances, 
particularly when a and b are close together (e.g. 
recognising some distant object; or computing its 
3D shape from relative motion; or guiding limbs 
relative to a visual target). Any representation 
other than a simple 'single firing rate' 
representation makes this a complex computation. 
These requirements, which together form a major 
challenge for any neural representation of positions, can be 
met by a wave representation: 
a. Spatial precision: If the volume containing the wave 
has spatial extent D, and the minimum possible 
wavelength is λ, then the achievable spatial precision is 
approximately one part in (D/λ), which can easily be a 
large number. If a neuron within the wave region has 
receptors over a spatial region with smaller extent d, 
then that neuron can be tuned to a range of wave 
vectors (i.e. a range of represented positions), with 
spatial precision (d/λ), which may still be large. 
b. Speed: Speed of storage and retrieval is bounded by 
the frequency of the wave, which is unknown, but may 
be high. After a few wave cycles, the wave can be set 
up and receptor neurons can detect it. There is no 
difficult speed/precision tradeoff. 
c. Computing Spatial Displacements: To meet this 
requirement, it is simplest to have two kinds of wave, a 
‘signal’ wave (which represents many objects at 
positions k) and an ‘attention’ wave which has a 
narrow range of wave vectors around some 
‘searchlight’ wave vector s. Then if neurons are 
receptive to the interference between these two waves, 
Cos(k.x) + Cos(s.x) ~ Cos( (k-s).x). Thus the 
interference pattern simply computes the displaced 
position vectors (k - s), with no spatial distortion. 
The ‘heterodyne principle’ in (c) directly calculates spatial 
displacements, and also gives a simple, distortion-free 
solution to the problem of spatial steering of signals – for 
example, steering the visual inputs from a face (wherever  
it may be relative to the animal) – to some face  
recognition module in cortex. Distortion-free spatial 
steering is essential for rapid learning of spatial patterns, 
and for recognising them once learnt. 
The key benefits of wave storage of positions - storing 
multiple object positions with high precision and low  
spatial distortion - are directly demonstrated by 
holography. 
One clear example of the requirement for precise storage 
of depth information, and calculation of small 
displacements in depth, is the requirement to compute 
shape from motion. [Murray et al. 2003] This is the use of 
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visual data (without stereopsis), together with a strong 
Bayesian prior probability that most objects are rigid 
bodies, to compute the 3D shape of an object from the 
relative motion of its parts (as caused by motion of the 
object, or of the viewer). 
This capability allows us rapidly to infer the 3D shape of a 
small, distant, rotating object, from its moving visual 2D 
projection. It can be modelled computationally as a 
Bayesian maximum likelihood fit to visual sense data, using 
a strong prior probability that the body is rigid. However, 
the actual computations, for a small or distant rotating 
body (e.g. occupying only a few degrees of the visual field), 
require high precision and speed  in representing and 
computing the depth displacements of points on the body. 
If the precision is degraded (for instance by random neural 
noise in the depths), the computation rapidly falls apart, 
and can infer no shaped from motion. 
In the example of shape from motion, wave storage of 
positions (including inferred depths) has obvious 
advantages of precision and computability, compared with 
the representation of positions in neural firing rates. The 
same advantages carry over to other types of spatial 
cognition; but they are particularly clear-cut when inferring 
shape from motion, for which no learning is required. 
The analogue wave representation of 3D positions avoids 
the complex design choices of a pure neural architecture 
and has intrinsically high performance for several of the 
key requirements (spatial precision, fast representation; 
computing precise spatial displacements, low spatial 
distortion). The wave architecture to do these things is 
simpler and has better  performance, than a purely neural 
architecture. 
The basic reason for this is the huge intrinsic advantage of 
an analogue computer. Waves and spatial positions are 
related by a simple analogue relationship (a Fourier 
transform), so the geometry of the wave vectors naturally 
represents the geometry of real space. The required 
computations emerge naturally from the physics of the 
wave and transducers. They do not need to be designed 
into neural connectivity and firing rates. 
There are other benefits. A wave representation can 
represent the positions of many objects at the same time, 
and has intrinsically high connectivity between its inputs 
and outputs. Any output neuron is connected to all input 
neurons, through the wave, but in a spatially selective way. 
These core requirements for spatial cognition have been in 
place since the Cambrian Era. Even a small advantage 
would have favoured the wave storage architecture at 
many periods over that long timescale, and it could have 
evolved many times over. But if the advantage of a wave is 
large, more probably it evolved once, and has dominated 
since then. 
An example of how geometry and waves get into neuronal 
architectures is the demonstration that lateral connections 
in the visual cortex are set up by travelling waves in the 
retina [Wong 1999] 
5. A Hub and Spoke Architecture 
This section summarises a related paper [Worden 2018]. 
Many cortex-centric models of cognition assume that there 
is peer-to-peer collaboration between different modular 
cortical knowledge sources. Different types of knowledge 
source include stereopsis, edge detection, shape 
recognition, shape from shading, multi-sensory integration 
and so on. There are probably may instances of each type 
of knowledge source (to apply in parallel to several objects 
around the animal), and there is evidence that different 
knowledge sources occupy different cortical regions. 
Optimal Bayesian spatial cognition would combine the 
constraints from all these knowledge sources into a single 
maximum-likelihood fit to the 3D positions of all objects 
around the animal, integrating sense data of all modalities.  
However, if this were done by peer-to-peer collaboration 
of all the knowledge sources, it would be inefficient in 
several ways: 
 The absolute 3D position of each object would need 
to be stored redundantly in several different 
knowledge sources, with continual cross-updating of 
the best estimated position. 
 To link N different knowledge sources in a peer-to-
peer manner, there would need to be of the order of 
N2 high bandwidth connections to convey the position 
messages between them. 
 Even in the approximation of Gaussian errors 
(quadratic negative log likelihoods), finding the best fit 
to the 3D positions of N objects involves inverting a 
3N by 3N matrix, which is an expensive computation. 
These reasons imply that the peer-to-peer architecture is 
not the best one, and that a hub-and-spoke architecture 
(also known as star architecture or a master slave network) 
will perform better. With its extensive two-way 
connections to cortex, the thalamus is an obvious 
candidate for the hub, holding a single ‘master’ copy of the 
3D location of each object or feature of interest, and 
acting as an ‘aggregator’ of constraints on the positions of 
things from all knowledge sources [Worden 2018] 
This aggregator model of spatial cognition is shown in the 
diagram. 
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In this model, the many cortical knowledge sources do not 
need to communicate position information directly to one 
another (there is no N2 communication problem), but only 
to the central aggregator. Each knowledge source can 
apply its own constraints on relative positions in an 
efficient., local process. The aggregator applies the global 
constraints to reconcile the constraints from different 
knowledge sources, separately for each feature of interest. 
Computationally this is efficient, but it requires high spatial 
resolution and performance from the aggregator. As  
described above, this can be achieved using wave storage 
of positions in the thalamus. 
Compared to the hub-and spoke architecture, the peer-to-
peer cortical architecture is uneconomical not only in 
connections (and therefore brain energy consumption) but 
also in complexity – the number of different connections 
that need to be specified [epi]genetically in the design of 
the brain. By comparison, peer-to-peer architecture does 
not score well in simplicity of brain design. 
Another advantage of the hub-and spoke architecture is 
that it offers a possible solution to the long-standing 
problem of feature [Treisman & Gelade 1980; Shadlen & 
Movshon 1999]: how do the different knowledge sources 
form temporary coalitions to find the best-fit positions of 
different features, and how is the computation organized 
so that different knowledge sources are dealing with the 
same feature at the same time? In this model, different 
features are bound by spatial position: if their estimated 
3D positions overlap strongly in the aggregator, they are 
treated as parts of the same object. 
6. Simplicity of Design and Evolution 
It is notable that the wave storage of spatial positions can 
be described by the rather simple diagram of section 3, and 
by the simple mathematics of the Fourier transform.  In 
contrast, a purely neural architecture for spatial cognition 
would involve many design choices, such as choices of 
coordinate systems, encoding of position coordinates, 
neural connectivity at many levels, and so on. A pure 
neural brain design appears to be much more complex 
than a design using wave storage for spatial cognition. 
Similarly, peer-to-peer cortical interactions would require a 
more complex brain design than the hub-and-spoke 
architecture. 
One might ask: “Is that a problem? Surely there have been 
half a billion years to evolve the best designs, and in that 
timescale evolution could have found a complex and 
efficient neural design.”. 
However, this argument does not hold. Evolution is a race, 
and the race goes to the species which can adapt the 
fastest. Consider two species which start out respectively 
with a wave storage of spatial positions, and with a pure 
neural storage - which may both initially be imprecise, 
inefficient and so on. Both species then evolve, and their 
evolution explores the two different design spaces for 
brains – wave storage of positions, and neural storage. As a 
first approximation, evolution can add useful design 
information (i.e. it can refine the designs of both brains) at 
an approximately equal rate (which is probably of the order 
of a fraction of a bit of useful design information per 
generation [Worden 1995]). Both species get better at 
spatial cognition, as their brain designs improve. 
For the species with wave storage of positions, the brain 
design is simpler. So the space of brain designs, which the 
evolution of that species explores, is a simpler space than 
the design space for the pure-neural species. The design 
space has lower dimensionality, and searching it is easier. 
Evolution can find the good regions in that design space, 
faster than it can find the good regions in a larger design 
space. Even if the pure neural species might eventually 
evolve to have a more efficient brain design than the 
species with wave storage, it will never get the chance to 
do so. Long before it does, the wave storage species will 
have out-competed it in every ecological niche (as the 
challenge of spatial cognition is similar for all niches – 
subject to the same laws of geometry) and it will have 
become extinct. 
Put another way, evolution is a process of local hill-
climbing in the space of possible brains, by random steps. 
If the design space of brains is smaller, there is a higher 
chance that any random step in brain design will increase 
fitness. For a more complex design, most random steps are 
bad steps, decreasing fitness. So a species with a simple 
brain design can hill-climb faster, and over generations it 
will out-compete a species with a more complex brain 
design. 
So there is a strong selection pressure to have the simplest 
brain design possible, for given level of performance – to 
be agile to win the race of cognitive evolution. Wave 
storage of 3D positions, with a hub and spoke architecture, 
is simpler design than pure neural storage – so we would 
expect it to be strongly favoured in the race. 
Primary Knowledge 
Sources (sense data)
Secondary
Knowledge 
Sources
Aggregator
K1
K2
K3
K4
K5
K6
K7
K8
K9
f1
f2
f3
f4
f5
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4
fi = position estimate of feature i
Type 1
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7. Connectivity of the Thalamus 
Previous sections have described how in computational 
terms, for both perception and action, a hub-and-spoke 
wave storage architecture is both simpler and more 
effective than a pure neural architecture – so will be doubly 
favoured by evolution. 
I now turn from theoretical computational aspects of the 
wave storage hypothesis, to the empirical evidence for it. 
In the theory of this paper, the main role of the thalamus is 
the storage of 3D spatial information – and as an 
‘aggregator’ it plays a central role in finding the Bayesian 
best fit to the location of any object around the animal, 
using sense data of different modalities. 
Which modalities? Sense data of most modalities 
(including vision, touch, proprioception, and hearing) can 
place precise constraints on the location of any object.  But 
olfaction generally does not. A smell can come from any 
direction or distance, and there may be no breeze to define 
what direction it comes from. Smell is of little use in 
locating objects precisely. 
It is therefore significant that across many species, sense 
data of all modalities pass through the thalamus – except 
smell, which goes through the olfactory bulb [Sherman & 
Guillery 2006]. One could plausibly argue that the 
thalamus is the gateway to cortex for only those sense data 
which are used to constrain the positions of things – in 
this theory, because the main function of the thalamus is 
the precise representation of locations. 
There appears to be no other theory of thalamic function 
which accounts simply for the fact that olfaction does not 
pass through the thalamus. 
8. Shape of the Thalamus and TRN 
Many parts of the brain, such as the hippocampus or the 
cortex, have shapes which are very variable across species. 
All that appears to matter is their synaptic connectivity, 
and that connectivity is accomplished in whatever way is 
most economical of axon length and energy consumption. 
For instance, in the mouse, the cortex is not folded, but 
cortical regions are still analogous to the folded primate 
cortex. 
In contrast to this, the shapes of the thalamus and the 
TRN are conserved across species. Across a wide range of 
species [Jones 1985] which includes mammals, birds and 
reptiles, and may include more species: 
 The thalamus has approximately equal extension in all 
three dimensions – it is approximately spherical. 
 The TRN has the form of a thin shell surrounding the 
dorsal thalamus. 
These facts fit well with the wave hypothesis. If the 
thalamus holds a wave excitation representing positions, 
then it needs to have approximately equal extension in all 
three directions, to accommodate an equal range of wave 
vectors (i.e. equal spatial precision) in all three directions. 
If the TRN is the transmitter of the wave, then it needs to 
be a thin shell surrounding the thalamus, to immerse the  
thalamus in the wave. 
The wave theory makes sense of the distinctive and well 
conserved anatomy of the thalamus and TRN. As will be 
described in the  next section, a purely neural model of 
thalamic function does not. 
9. The Exploding Thalamus 
If all the functionality of the thalamus were achieved by 
neural synaptic connections, then in terms of brain energy 
consumption, the anatomy of the thalamus and the TRN 
would not make sense. 
Over evolutionary time and in morphogenesis, parts of the 
brain arrange themselves so as to minimise net axon length 
between them, to minimise the energy costs of the axons, 
subject to the required neural connectivity [Van Essen 
1997, Attwell & Laughlin 2001, Chklovskii et al. 2002]. 
This accounts for many aspects of brain anatomy and 
physiology, such as the folding of the cortex in larger 
mammals. 
From this standpoint of brain energetics, the anatomy of 
the thalamus and the TRN do not make sense. 
The thalamus consists of a number of different primary 
and secondary nuclei, with no direct connections between 
the nuclei [Sherman & Guillery 2006] Why then are the 
nuclei clustered together? Aggregate axon length could be 
reduced (and so brain energy costs could be reduced) if, 
over evolutionary time, the thalamic nuclei had migrated 
out towards cortex (exploded), reducing the net length of 
thalamo-cortical and cortico-thalamic axons. 
Similarly, the TRN consists of a thin shell around the 
dorsal thalamus, with no neurons projecting from the 
TRN outwards to cortex [Jones 1987]. All TRN neurons 
project inwards to the thalamus. Axonal energy costs 
would be reduced if the TRN was not entirely outside the 
thalamus, but had migrated some distance towards its 
centre. 
These considerations have been confirmed by approximate 
numerical calculations of aggregate axon lengths in homo 
sapiens in [Worden 2010, 2014]. Exploding the thalamus 
would reduce axonal energy costs.  They remain to be 
tested by more precise computations using connectome 
data. 
The distinctive anatomy of the thalamus and the TRN 
make good sense if the thalamus is immersed in a wave, 
with the TRN as transmitter. In that case, the thalamic 
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nuclei need to stay close together, and to be inside the 
TRN, in order to be all immersed in the same wave. This 
further supports the hypothesis that the thalamus holds a 
wave, and is reinforced by the wide cross-species 
preservation of the shape of the thalamus. 
10. The Form of Consciousness 
This section is a brief summary of a related paper [Worden 
2019], which may be read in conjunction with this paper – 
because the form of consciousness we experience may be 
one of the strongest pieces of evidence for a wave 
excitation in the thalamus. 
There is one very important observation about the form of 
consciousness, which is rarely noted, but is central to our 
lived experience. A large part of our conscious experience 
is just like the real world . Consciousness is a model of 
current reality; it is not just a random set of qualia, like a 
Jackson Pollock painting. 
An important part of our consciousness consists of 3-
dimensional geometric model of the world around us 
[Rudrauf et al 2017, Williford et al 2018] – and it seems to 
be a rather precise and faithful model. 
Most current theories of consciousness , such as [Baars 
1988, Tononi 2012], which are based on the classical 
dynamics of neurons in the brain, do not attempt to 
account for this important experimental fact, and would 
have great difficulty in doing so. 
However, if there is a wave excitation in the thalamus – 
whose purpose is to hold a faithful 3-D model of local 
space - and if consciousness was caused by this wave 
excitation, then one would expect the form of 
consciousness to be a faithful 3-D model of local space, as 
we actually experience it.  
Linking consciousness to a wave excitation in the thalamus 
would give natural and unforced agreement with the key 
fact about the form of consciousness – much better 
agreement than other current theories. This makes it a 
promising line of enquiry, and it is explored further in 
[Worden 2019]. 
11. Conclusions 
Evolution has resulted in a series of elegant, appropriate 
and often simple designs, from the most basic and 
universal features of life (such as the form of DNA) 
onwards. 
The core task of any animal brain is to understand where 
things are in local space, to control the animal’s 
movements. A wave excitation can provide an accurate,  
simple and computable representation of the locations of 
things in 3D space. 
Compared with a wave representation, a purely neural 
representation of 3D space would be complicated and 
inefficient. For the reasons described in this paper, we 
should consider the possibility that the brain represents 
local 3D space directly and simply - by a wave excitation in 
the thalamus. 
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